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"Controlling" Securities Fraud: Proposed Liability
Standards for Controlling Persons Under the
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts
INTRODUCTION
Despite congressional enactment of the Securities Act of
19331 (1933 Act) and the Securities and Exchange Act of 19342
(1934 "Act), fraudulent activities continue to plague the securi-
ties markets. 3 Adopted to deter fraud and restore confidence in
the securities markets,4 the Acts impose broad accountability
standards for fraudulent conduct. Congress created direct lia-
bility for individuals who commit securities fraud,5 and as an
additional deterrent, section 15 of the 1933 Act and section
1. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-
77aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The 1933 Act was enacted primarily to regulate
the initial distribution of securities, to deter fraud, and to make all informa-
tion pertaining to the purchase of the offered securities available to the inves-
tor. 1 L. Loss, SEcURrTIES REGULATION 130 (2d ed. 1961).
2. Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). The 1934 Act was adopted to regulate the
securities markets, to provide a disclosure method to the people buying and
selling securities, to create remedies for fraud, and to control the amount of
the nation's credit being put into the securities market. 1 L. Loss, supra note
1, at 130-31.
3. See Memorandum of the SEC in Support of the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act of 1982, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1039, Special 1, pt. II, at 21
(Sept. 28, 1983) (despite vigorous enforcement efforts securities violations con-
tinue to occur because of the opportunity to reap huge profits with small
risks); see also Burrough, Fates Are Disparate for Those Charged With Insider
Trading, Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (reviewing recent convictions of
prominent individuals in the securities industry for insider trading).
4. 77 CONG. REC. 2914 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Greenwood), reprinted in
1 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURIIEs ACT
OF 1933 AND SECURITES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, Item 7 (1973) [hereinafter
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. After the 1929 stock market crash, Congress believed
the "necessity for... legislation to help restore confidence in our local bank-
ing institutions [was] great." Id. In a special message to Congress, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt also called attention to the fragile state of financial in-
stitutions, stressing the need to deter securities fraud. See 77 CONG. REC. 937
(1933) (message from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to the Senate regarding
regulation of security issues), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, Item 3.
5. Under the 1933 Act, for example, if any part of a registration state-
ment is untrue or omits a material fact, an investor may sue every person who
signed the registration statement; was a director of, or partner in, the issuer at
the time of the filing;, is named on the statement; took any part in the prepara-
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20(a) of the 1934 Act6 establish secondary liability for persons
who exercise "control" over primary violators of the securities
regulations.7
tion or certification of the document (as an accountant, engineer or appraiser);
or performed underwriter duties. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(5) (1982).
If a securities violation does occur, the investor may recover for any loss,
including the price at which the security was offered to the public, other dam-
ages incurred, and attorney's fees. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k-771 (1982). Moreover, any
person found to violate the 1933 Act is subject to a $10,000 fine and a five-year
prison term. 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1982). Willful violations of the 1934 Act may re-
sult in a $10,000 fine and a two-year prison term. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
6. Section 15 of the 1933 Act provides:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or other-
wise, or who, pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or un-
derstanding with one or more other persons by or through stock
ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls any person liable under sec-
tions 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling per-
son had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the exist-
ence of the facts by reason of which the liability of the controlled
person is alleged to exist.
15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act provides:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable
under any provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation there-
under shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the same
extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such con-
trolled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constitut-
ing the violation or cause of action.
15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
Although similar on their faces, the statutes differ significantly. An ac-
tion may be brought under § 15 only for violations of §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982). Section 11 addresses civil liability for the distribu-
tion of false or misleading registration statements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982). Sec-
tion 12 provides civil liability for violations of § 5, requiring securities to be
registered before transporting them for sale, and the distribution of false
proxy statements. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-771 (1982). Under § 20(a), however, a con-
trolling person may be held liable for violating any section of the 1934 Act. 15
U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). Because of its broader application, § 20(a) of the 1934
Act is used more frequently.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77o, 78t(a) (1982). But see Stoller v. Baldwin-United
Corp., 41 Bankr. 884, 890 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (liability under controlling person
provisions is "neither remote nor secondary").
Although Congress did not define a controlling person, the courts gener-
ally consider any person who has control or influence over another to be in a
controlling position. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945,
959 (5th Cir. 1981). For examples of controlling persons, see Sharp v. Coopers
& Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981) (accounting firms), cert denied, 455
U.S. 938 (1982); Marbury Management v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.)
(brokerage firms), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521
F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.) (newspaper publisher), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1025
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When it adopted the secondary liability provisions of the
1933 and 1934 Acts, Congress intentionally failed to define con-
trolling person.8 Congress believed that it could not predict
every potential way of influencing or controlling a person and
thus decided to allow the courts to draw the appropriate bound-
aries in particular cases.9 Without congressional guidance,10
however, courts have failed to develop a uniform standard for
imposing secondary liability on controlling persons.1 ' Some
courts interpret the controlling person provisions as requiring
proof that the controlling person, in some meaningful manner,
intentionally participated 2 in the controlled person's fraudu-
(1975); Mader v. Armel, 461 F.2d 1123, 1125-26 (6th Cir.) (directors), cert de-
nied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972); Kammerer v. Weaver, 445 F.2d 76, 79 (7th Cir. 1971)
(corporate sales managers); Whittaker v. Wall, 226 F.2d 868, 871-72 (8th Cir.
1955) (officer and stockholder); Draney v. Wilson, Morton, Assaf & McElligott,
597 F. Supp. 528, 531 (D. Ariz. 1983) (municipality). But see Fuls v. Shastina
Properties, 448 F. Supp. 983, 989-90 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (lenders cannot be control-
ling persons); Carr v. New York Stock Exch., 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1303 (N.D.
Cal. 1976) (mem.) (national securities exchange cannot be controlling person).
8. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934) (in declining to de-
fine controlling persons, Congress noted that it is "difficult if not impossible to
enumerate or to anticipate the many ways in which actual control may be ex-
erted"), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18; see 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa, 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (no definition provided).
9. While arguing against defining a controlling person, Representative
Lea asserted that the determination of who is a controlling person is a "ques-
tion of fact to be determined by the issues presented in the case." 78 CONG.
REc. 8095 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 8.
10. Although almost all lower courts interpreting §§ 15 and 20(a) of the
securities acts agree that Congress did not provide a standard on which to base
a controlling person's liability, the United States Supreme Court seems to dif-
fer. Without elaborating, the Supreme Court has noted that, "[i]n each in-
stance that Congress created express civil liability . . . it clearly specified
whether recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct, neg-
ligence, or entirely innocent mistake." Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 207 (1976) (citing §§ 15 and 20(a) of the securities acts).
11. SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (history of
interpretations of controlling person provisions has "hardly been a history of
consistency"), cert denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); see Note, The Burden of Con-
trol:" Derivative Liability Under Section 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1019, 1021-22 (1973) (most courts determine con-
trolling person's liability with "vague labels and uncertain analysis[, and only]
a few courts have carefully delineated the determinative elements of 'con-
trol' "); see also Ferrara & Sanger, Derivative Liability in Securities Law:
Controlling Person Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Aiding and Abetting,
40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1007, 1010 (1983) (only better reasoned cases separate
issue of control from issue of whether defendant's conduct satisfies statutory
defenses); infra notes 60-89 and accompanying text.
12. Courts asserting that a controlling person cannot be held liable unless
the complainant proves the controlling person intentionally participated in the
fraud call the standard "culpable participation." See, e.g., Orloff v. Allman, 819
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lent conduct.13 Other courts reject this position, asserting that
liability does not depend on whether the controlling person ac-
tually participated in the fraud,14 but only on whether the con-
trolling person could have discovered or deterred the
fraudulent activity.15 Once courts decide on a standard for sec-
ondary liability, they apply that same standard under the con-
trolling person provisions of both the 1933 and the 1934 Acts.16
This Note contends that application of an identical stan-
dard to actions brought under either securities act has caused
courts difficulty in developing a secondary liability standard for
controlling persons. The Note suggests that although Congress
adopted both Acts to accomplish essentially the same goals, the
statutes employ substantially different means to achieve those
goals.17 Part I introduces the securities acts and reviews the
legislative history of sections 15 and 20(a), the controlling per-
son provisions. Part II discusses conflicting judicial interpreta-
tions of those provisions. Part III analyzes why current
standards inadequately reflect Congress's intent and proposes
that courts should adopt a different standard to determine con-
trolling person liability under each Act. The Note concludes
that courts should construe the controlling person provision to
require a negligence standard under the 1933 Act and a reck-
F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1987); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 885 (3d
Cir. 1975). This is a misnomer, however, because culpable participation does
not necessarily require a controlling person to consciously intend to participate
in the fraud. See BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 341 (5th ed. 1979) (defining culpa-
bility as blameworthiness that requires "knowing, reckless, or negligent con-
duct") (emphasis added). Courts requiring culpable participation in effect
require intentional participation. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 890 (it
must be apparent that the controlling person intentionally furthered the
fraud). Thus, for clarity, this Note uses the term intentional participation to
refer to what some courts call culpable participation in securities fraud.
13. See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957-58 (5th
Cir. 1981) (§§ 15 and 20(a) should be given same interpretation).
17. Congress enacted the 1933 Act to regulate the initial distribution of se-
curities and to promote full and fair disclosure of securities information. See
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740 (1973); see also H.R.
REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933) (literature regarding new issues
must fully disclose character of securities to afford investors accurate judg-
ments), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18. Congress
enacted the 1934 Act to regulate transactions on the securities exchanges and
over-the-counter markets. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 740; see also S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1934) (investigation of buying and selling
practices demonstrates need to regulate trading), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 17.
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lessness standard under the 1934 Act. Differentiating the stan-
dards for secondary liability under the Acts promotes the
general legislative goals while reflecting the different regula-
tory functions of each Act.
I. THE CONTROLLING PERSON PROVISIONS OF THE
1933 AND 1934 SECURITIES ACTS: SECTIONS 15
AND 20(a)
Although Congress adopted both the 1933 and 1934 Acts in
response to the October 1929 stock market crash', for the same
general purposes-to deter fraud and encourage investor confi-
dence in the securities marketsl'---the Acts regulate very dif-
ferent activities. The 1933 Act primarily regulates initial stock
offerings and the distribution of information concerning their
character. 20 It requires persons seeking to issue and sell securi-
ties publicly to disclose information necessary for informed
investment decisions both to the Securities Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) and to potential securities purchasers.21 In contrast
to regulating the offering and sale of securities, the 1934 Act
regulates the markets in which they are traded.22 In general, it
requires the stock issuers and exchanges to register with the
SEC and abide by certain trading prohibitions.23
Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts allow investors to recover
losses, subject to varying procedural restrictions, from persons
who violate the Acts.24 In addition to primary liability, both
18. 77 CONG. REc. 2939-40 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Koppleman), reprinted
in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 7.
19. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
20. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 130. But see inkfra note 149.
21. Responsibility of Corporate Offwers & Directors Under Federal Secur-
ities Laws, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1178, pt. II, § 202, at 23 (2d ed. May 21,
1986).
22. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 130-31; see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-5 (1934) (1934 Act intended to regulate securities exchanges and to pre-
vent fraudulent transactions), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note
4, Item 18.
23. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 131. Registrants must keep information
filed with the SEC current by filing annual and other reports. Id. The SEC
may inspect this information at any time and may deny or revoke registration.
Id. Additionally, there are provisions governing securities trading by the issu-
ers' officers, directors, and principal shareholders. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)
(1982) (directors and officers may not sell and purchase or purchase and sell
within six-month period).
24. For the procedural restrictions applicable to suits brought under the
1933 Act, see infra text accompanying notes 156-60. For those requirements
under the 1934 Act, see infra text accompanying notes 173-78.
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the 1933 and 1934 Acts permit an investor to recover from those
persons who are deemed secondarily liable. Section 15 of the
1933 Act and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act establish liability
similar in nature to the common law doctrine of respondeat su-
perior.25 Section 15 imposes secondary liability on persons who
"through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise" control an-
other person who is liable under the Act.26 Similarly, section
20(a) provides that a person who "directly or indirectly, con-
trols any person" liable under the Act shall also be liable.27
Those provisions hold the controlling person jointly and sever-
ally liable for the controlled person's fraudulent activities.28
25. Respondeat superior is the common law principle that holds an em-
ployer responsible for the tortious acts of employees and agents even though
the employer may be without fault. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1) (1958); see Note, Rule lOb-5--the Equivalent Scope of Liability Under
Respondeat Superior and Section 20(a)-Imposing a Benefit Requirement on
Apparent Authority, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1383 (1982) (discussion of relationship
between controlling person provisions and common law principles).
Despite Congress's explicit statement that the remedies provided by the
securities acts only add to "all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law," 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(a) (1982), the circuits disagree as to whether the
controlling person provisions preclude the imposition of secondary liability on
the basis of agency principles such as respondeat superior. The Second,
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits hold that the controlling person provi-
sions are not exclusive sources of secondary liability under the securities acts;
the Third and Ninth Circuits reach the opposite conclusion. Compare Mar-
bury Management v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir.) (securities laws do not
preclude use of agency principles), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980); Holloway
v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 694 (6th Cir. 1976) (plaintiff permitted to proceed
under doctrine of respondeat superior); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036,
1052 (7th Cir. 1974) (securities laws have not preempted common law); Johns
Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1130 (4th Cir. 1970) (permitting use of
agency principles), cert denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974) with Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1975) (use of agency principles prohibited);
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir.) (violation of securities
acts must be based on controlling person provision, not agency doctrines), cert
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
According to some courts, using agency doctrines against controlling per-
sons circumvents the purpose behind the adoption of the securities acts be-
cause the common law doctrine provides no affirmative defenses while the
securities acts do. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 885-86. Other courts advocate the
use of agency principles because if courts impose liability only when the con-
trolling person was intentionally involved in the fraud, many people could es-
cape liability merely by showing that they did not actually take part in the
fraud committed by the agent. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980) (criticizing Rochez Bros.).
26. See supra note 6.
27. See supra note 6.
28. See supra note 6. Joint and several liability is applied when two or
more persons' wrongful acts cause injury to a third person and it is impossible
to determine in what proportion each act contributed to the injury. 74 AM.
1988]
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Both provisions also provide controlling persons with affirma-
tive defenses. 29
Although the initial draft of the 1933 Act did not contain a
provision similar to section 15, the current controlling person
provision,30 Congress eventually amended the bill by incorpo-
rating "dummy" provisions.31  Those provisions defined
JuR. 2D Torts § 62 (1979). All wrongdoers are responsible for the entire injury
even if their wrongful acts alone might not have caused the injury or the in-
jury would have occurred from other wrongful acts alone. Id.
29. Section 15 of the 1933 Act holds a controlling. person liable unless "the
controlling person had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the
existence of the [fraud]." 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982). Section 20(a) of the 1934 Act
holds a controlling person liable unless "the controlling person acted in good
faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the
violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982). Congress did not indicate in the legislative
history why it chose to use different wording in each statute when providing
for the defenses. Although the defenses under §§ 15 and 20(a) differ substan-
tively and literally, see generally Note, The "Controlling Persons" Liability of
Broker-Dealers for Their Employees' Federal Securities Violations, 1974 DUKE
L.J. 824 (arguing the provisions are substantively unique), most courts assert
that the sentence structure of the two statutes is very similar and the provi-
sions must be identically construed. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Par-
tridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957-58 (5th Cir. 1981). Thus, courts often hold that the
burden of proof is the same under each provision. See, e.g., Pharo v. Smith, 621
F.2d 656, 673 (5th Cir. 1980); see also cases cited infra note 135.
30. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 CONG. REc. 2910 (1933), reprinted in
3 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 27. Section 11 of the bill, however,
did permit a director (or a person performing similar duties) or a partner to be
held liable for false or misleading registration statements even if that person
was not a director at the time of the distribution of the registration statement.
Id.
31. In amending H.R. 5480, the original version of the 1933 Act that
passed in the House, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency deleted
everything following the enacting clause of the bill and supplemented as an
amendment S. 875, the Senate's version of what the 1933 Act should contain.
Compare H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 CONG. REc. 2910 (1933) (as passed
by the House), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 7 with
S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 CONG. REc. 2979-82 (1933) (as reported from the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, Item 8.
Section 2(k) of S. 875 defined a dummy as "a person who holds a legal or
nominal title to any property but is under moral or legal obligation to recog-
nize another as the owner." S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 77 CONG. REc. 2979-82
(1933), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 8. Section 13
of the same bill prohibited "any person who is a 'dummy' for another to sign a
registration statement without disclosing his principal." Id.
The House objected to the Senate's amendment, and a Conference Com-
mittee was called to propose a compromise. 77 CONG. REC. 3085 (1933), re-
printed in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 9. A compromise was
reached and the conference report, which included the controlling person pro-
visions, was ultimately adopted by both the House and the Senate as the 1933
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dummy3 2 in a way that prevented corporate directors from
evading liability for false or misleading registration statements
by using persons not involved with the company to sign the
statements. 33 Subsequently, most of the dummy provisions
were merged and incorporated into the final 1933 Act, a merger
that created section 15's controlling person provision.3 Unlike
the deleted dummy provisions, however, Congress did not de-
fine controlling person,35 noting only that control was to be in-
terpreted broadly to permit the provision to have effect
whenever control actually is exerted.36
The 1933 Act's controlling person provision originally did
not provide an affirmative defense.3 7 After enactment, how-
ever, the bill was criticized as too drastic and vague38 because it
seemed to permit holding a controlling person secondarily lia-
ble for merely having the potential to exercise control but not
for actually exercising any control or influence.39 Responding
Act. 77 CONG. REc. 3903, 4009 (1933), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, Item 13.
32. See supra note 31.
33. The Senate was concerned that directors would seek to evade liability
by appointing directors to serve on the board who had no actual authority to
direct or manage corporate affairs. Federal Securities Acts: Hearings on H.R.
4314 Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 122 (1933) (statement of Rep. Parker) ("You are going to have [the
fraud] done through one or two men. You will have these dummies who do
not care, and who will take chances."), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, Item 20; see Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630
F.2d 1111, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1980) (discussing legislative history of §§ 15 and
20(a)); SEC v. Management Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting
purpose of dummy provisions was to prevent evasion of securities laws); S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, Item 17.
34. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 19.
35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (no definition of con-
trolling person supplied).
36. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18. The Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce further explained that the determination of control should not
rest on a "mathematical formula," but should be determined on the unique
facts of each case. Id.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1982).
38. 78 CoNG. REc. 8668 (1934) (remarks of Sen. Fletcher), reprinted in 4
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 10; see 78 CONG. REc. 7868 (1934)
(Senator Maloney noted that securities industry was fearful of securities legis-
lation and "[was] told it should be afraid of [the controlling person provi-
sions]."), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 8.
39. Congress acknowledged that it did not intend the controlling person
provisions to provide liability for the mere existence of control. Rather,
control must be "effectively exercised to bring about the action upon which li-
1988]
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to that criticism, Congress in 1934 amended section 15, adding
an affirmative defense that prohibited secondary liability if the
controlling person had "no knowledge of or reasonable ground
to believe in the existence of the [fraud]." 40
At the same time it amended section 15 of the 1933 Act,
Congress enacted the 1934 Act and used section 15 as a model
for section 20(a), the 1934 Act's controlling person provision.4'
Section 20(a) provoked strong opposition and, like section 15,
was criticized as conceptually vague.42 Despite arguments that
a definition was needed,43 Congress thought it undesirable to
define explicitly a controlling person.4 It decided instead that
ability is based." 78 CONG. REc. 8669 (1934) (memorandum suggesting amend-
ments), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 10.
40. Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 208, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1982)). The original draft of the § 15 amendment provided that "unless the
act for which such controlled person is alleged to be liable... was not per-
formed at the direction of the controlling person nor to enable such control-
ling person to evade liability." H.R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 78 CONG. REC.
8667-68 (1934) (as amended by the Senate), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, Item 29. Congress did not discuss why the original draft of
§ 15's affirmative defense was rewritten before being incorporated into the
1933 Act. The change in the words used in the original to those in the final
amendment, however, is significant. The original wording required proof that
the controlling person did not orchestrate or direct the fraud. The adopted af-
firmative defense is more difficult to prove because it requires showing that
the controlling person did not act negligently rather than intentionally. See
infra notes 145-60 and accompanying text.
41. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S.
Res. 97 Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 15, at 6571 (1934) (noting that 1934 Act's controlling person provision
was "taken verbatim" from 1933 Act), reprinted in 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, Item 22.
42. Representative Hollister argued that the term controlling person was
not even an existing legal term and thus would cause confusion in litigation.
78 CONG. REc. 8094 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATmE HISTORY, supra note 4,
Item 8. He asked if any member of the House of Representatives could define
the term. Id. When he did not receive a response, the Congressman moved to
delete the entire provision from the bill. Id. at 8094-95.
Subsequently, courts have upheld the controlling person provisions de-
spite further allegations that the concept of control under the acts is vague
and indefinite in violation of the fifth amendment. See, e.g., United States v.
Wolfson, 269 F. Supp. 621, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
43. 78 CONG. REC. 8094-95 (1934) (exchange between Reps. Hollister and
Lea regarding controlling person provisions), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 4, Item 8.
44. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934) reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (no definition supplied).
Despite courts' inconsistent definitions of a controlling person, Congress
continually has refused to define a controlling person for purposes of secon-
dary liability in statutes subsequent to the securities acts. Two years after
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courts should determine controlling person status based on the
facts presented in each case.45
Section 20(a) closely resembles section 15 of the 1933 Act,
but the affirmative defense provided by the 1934 Act differs sig-
nificantly from that in the 1933 Act.46 The 1933 Act exculpates
a controlling person who acted reasonably under the circum-
stances.47 The 1934 Act, on the other hand, does not impose lia-
bility even if negligent conduct is proven as long as the
controlling person acted in "good faith and did not... induce"
the fraud.48 Thus, the 1933 Act bases a controlling person's lia-
bility on an objective reasonable person standard,49 whereas the
1934 Act uses a subjective good faith standard.50
adopting the 1934 Act, Congress enacted the Public Utilities Holding Act and
in 1940 the Investment Company Act. Both statutes were enacted to prevent
opportunities for unfair treatment of investors. 2 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 766.
Both statutes repeatedly refer to the control concept and contain definitions.
The Investment Company Act defines control as "the power to exercise a con-
trolling influence over the management or policies of a company, unless such
power is solely the result of an official position." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9) (1982).
Any person owning 25% of the voting securities of the company is presumed to
be in control. Id. Although the Public Utilities Holding Act does not explic-
itly define control, the terms holding company and subsidiary company are
defined to include any company which "controls... with power to vote 10 per
centum or more of the outstanding voting securities." 15 U.S.C. § 79b(7)-(8)
(1982).
Even in the sections within those statutes that allow a controlling person
to be held secondarily liable, there are no precise standards on which to base
liability. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-64 (1982) (provision allowing controlling person to
be held secondarily liable). Additionally, in adopting § 13(c) of the Commodity
Exchange Act in 1968, Congress modeled it after § 15 of the 1933 Act and
§ 20(a) of the 1934 Act. S. REP. No. 384, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1982). This
provision also fails to state the exact basis on which to hold a controlling per-
son liable. See 7 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982).
45. 78 CONG. REc. 8095 (1934) (congressional rejection of motion to either
delete controlling person provision or adopt definition), reprinted in 4 LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 8.
46. Cf. Note, supra note 29, at 839 (the controlling person provisions re-
quire distinct standards to impose liability).
47. See infra notes 114-28 and cases cited therein.
48. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1982).
49. See Note, Liability of Controlling Persons-Common Law and Statu-
tory Theories of Secondary Liability, 24 DRAKE L. REv. 621, 635 (1975) (Q 15's
affirmative defense must be scrutinized on factual basis with reasonable
amount of objectivity).
50. See Note, supra note 11, at 1025 (good faith must be measured against
subjective rather than objective standards).
Although the plain language of §§ 15 and 20(a) demonstrates Congress's
intent to provide controlling persons with unique affirmative defenses, the leg-
islative history of those provisions is surprisingly thin. Congress explicitly ad-
dressed who could be a controlling person, see H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1933) (controlling status should not be limited to 51% of voting
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II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF SECTIONS 15
AND 20(a) OF THE 1933 AND 1934
SECURITIES ACTS
Congress's decision to leave controlling person undefined
in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts has divided courts regarding the
proper interpretation and application of the controlling person
provisions.51 Courts generally use a two-part test to determine
power), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18, and noted
that liability should not be based solely on the controlling person's position of
influence without the exercise of any power, 78 CONG. REc. 8669 (1934), re-
printed in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 10. The legislative his-
tory, however, suggests nothing concerning the appropriate standard of
culpability for controlling person liability. Moreover, industry representatives
who criticized both the 1933 and 1934 Acts in extraordinary detail, see, ag.,
Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, S. Res. 56, and S. Res. 97
Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.,
pt. 15, at 6639 (1934) (Mr. Whitney, President of the New York Stock Ex-
change, criticizing controlling person provisions), reprinted in 6 & 7 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 22, failed to express concern about
Congress's lack of a definition of a controlling person or its failure to delineate
the applicable standard of culpability.
Other commentators also have concluded that the legislative history con-
cerning the controlling person provisions does not help in determining the
standard of liability. See, e.g., Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 11, at 1012 (Con-
gress did not address standard upon which to base controlling person's liabil-
ity); Note, supra note 11, at 1023 (Congress devoted only single paragraph of
legislative history to controlling person provisions); Note, supra note 49, at
628-29 (legislative history of controlling person provisions is short and vague).
51. Compare Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1987) (Congress
intended liability to be imposed only if controlling person participated in the
fraud); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981) (to impose
liability upon controlling person, intentional participation must be evidenced),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d
Cir. 1973) (§§ 15 and 20(a) impose liability only for intentional participation)
with Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985) (Congress intended lia-
bility to be imposed if controlling person was in position in which the fraud
could have been discovered), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 1072 (1986); Henrick-
sen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 884 (7th Cir.) (controlling person need not
participate in the fraud to be held liable), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981);
Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 42 (10th Cir. 1971) (indirect means of
discipline or influence is enough to hold controlling person liable).
Noting that the provisions were not defined in the acts, federal courts look
to other sources for aid in devising a standard to use in determining if a person
can be held liable under §§ 15 and 20(a) of the Acts. See, e.g., Marbury Man-
agement v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 712-15 (2d Cir.) (considering common law sec-
ondary liability doctrines), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1011 (1980). Courts
frequently look to the definition promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), which provides: "The term 'control' (including the terms
'controlling,' 'controlled by' and 'under common control with') means the pos-
session, direct or indirect, of the power to direct or cause the direction of the
management and policies of a person, whether through the ownership of vot-
ing securities, by contract, or otherwise." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405, 240.12b-2 (1987).
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secondary liability under the securities acts' controlling person
provisions.5 2 The first prong requires the complainant to
demonstrate that the person occupied a position of control,5
3
and the second prong demands a showing of some level of in-
volvement in the controlled person's fraudulent activities.54
Most courts construe the first requirement broadly, requiring
only that the controlling person possess some indirect means of
discipline or influence over the controlled person.55 Although
courts agree on this broad interpretation under the first prong
The SEC construes the rule broadly and does not require intentional participa-
tion to hold a controlling person secondarily liable. See Speech by Commis-
sioner A.A. Sommer, Jr., Directors and the Federal Securities Laws (criticizing
recent Second Circuit case mandating intentional participation), reprinted in
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH- 79,669 (Feb. 27, 1974).
Although courts note the SEC's interpretation, they do not necessarily rely
upon it. See Safeway Portland Employees' Fed. Credit Union v. C.H. Wagner
& Co., 501 F.2d 1120, 1124 n.17 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting SEC definition but not
relying upon it); Leff v. C.I.P. Corp., 540 F. Supp. 857, 867 (S.D. Ohio 1982)
(same). But see G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 957-58 (5th
Cir. 1981) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(f) (1979)) (definitions adopted by SEC are
standard to determine controlling person).
52. See, e.g., Orloff, 819 F.2d at 906 (plaintiffs must prove control and in-
tentional participation); Metge, 762 F.2d at 631 (evidence must demonstrate
that defendant actually participated in corporate operations and that defend-
ant controlled specific transaction); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1980) (proof of control and good faith
required to decide issues).
53. See, e.g., Buhler v. Audio Leasing Corp., 807 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir.
1987) (complainant first must show that defendant had power and influence
over controlled person). The first element of the test addresses who is a con-
trolling person, not whether that person is liable. Kersh v. General Council of
Assemblies of God, 804 F.2d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 1986).
54. See, e.g., Kersh, 804 F.2d at 549 (after determining defendant is con-
trolling person, court must look at level of involvement in the fraud).
55. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967), cert denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968). The Eighth Circuit noted that the controlling person pro-
vision is remedial and should be construed liberally. Myzel, 386 F.2d at 738; cf.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (to effectuate
purposes, provisions should not be construed technically); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 185 (1963) (provisions should be con-
strued flexibly).
In accordance with Congress's anticipation of the countless ways to exer-
cise control, see H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1934) (although
noting impossibility of defining controlling person, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce did note examples of ways to exert control, including
stock ownership, leases, contracts, and agencies), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18, courts impose few limitations on the categories
of persons who meet the standard of controlling status. For an example of the
broad interpretation of control, see In re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec.
Cases, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,258 (N.D. Ga.
1981) (holding that attorneys can be controlling persons) and cases cited supra
note 7.
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of the test,5 6 they have failed to develop a uniform standard for
the second part of the test.51 In determining the extent of par-
ticipation necessary to justify imposing secondary liability,
some courts have adopted a broad interpretation of the control-
ling person provisions,58 while other courts have construed
those provisions narrowly.5 9
A. THE INTENTIONAL PARTICIPATION STANDARD OF
SECONDARY LIABILITY
Under the second prong of the test, some courts require
the complainant to prove actual participation before imposing
secondary liability.60 In Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades,6 1 for example,
56. See Buhler, 807 F.2d at 835 (complainant must first show defendant
had influence over controlled person); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 670-71
(5th Cir. 1980) (ownership of less than 10% interest in company not sufficient
control); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 890 (3d Cir. 1975) (must deter-
mine whether defendant had actual or potential control); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, 515 F.2d 801, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1975) (evidence that defendant occu-
pied prominent position within company); Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036,
1051 (7th Cir. 1974) (control aspect of vicarious liability is first element to con-
sider); Moerman v. Zipco, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 439, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (evidence
of control over day-to-day operations sufficient to deem director controlling
person).
57. Courts generally require a person to be either an intentional partici-
pant or to have been in a position in which the fraud could have been discov-
ered. See infra text accompanying notes 51-89. But see Holmes v. Bateson, 583
F.2d 542, 560 (1st Cir. 1978) (using strict liability standard to hold company
liable).
58. See infra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
60. Although the circuits do not always adhere to one approach when de-
termining secondary liability, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits generally agree that to impose liability under the control-
ling person provisions, the controlling person must intentionally participate in
the fraud. See Kersh v. General Council of Assemblies of God, 804 F.2d 546,
549 (9th Cir. 1986) (evidence of intentional participation establishes prima fa-
cie case of liability); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp.,
602 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir. 1979) (controlling person will not be liable for failure
to supervise), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Carpenter v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 594 F.2d 388, 395 (4th Cir.) (although wavering on the issue, court seems
to require intentional participation), cert denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); Straub v.
Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596 (3d Cir. 1976) (controlling person must be
culpable confederate in the fraud); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir.
1974) (controlling person must be shown to have knowingly used controlled
person to be held liable), cert denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Sennott v. Rodman
& Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39-40 (7th Cir.) (controlling person not liable because
he was not an intentional participant), cert denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973); Kra-
vitz v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 212-13 (D. Mass.
1978) (failure to supervise will be considered intentional participation required
to hold controlling person liable).
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the Third Circuit interpreted sections 15 and 20(a) narrowly,
requiring the complainant to prove that the controlling person
intentionally participated in the controlled person's fraudulent
activity.62 Intentional participation may take the form of direct
or indirect involvement in the fraud,6 3 but in either case the
controlling person must consciously intend to aid the fraudu-
lent scheme.6
Courts interpreting the controlling person provisions to re-
quire intentional participation offer several justifications.65 If
intentional participation is not required, these courts reason, li-
ability could be imposed solely because of the ability to influ-
ence or control securities activities without regard to the
61. 527 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1975).
62. Id- at 890 (Congress would not have enacted controlling person provi-
sion while permitting liability to rest on something other than intentional par-
ticipation). Rochez Brothers sued M.S. & R., Inc. and Charles Rhoades, the
M.S. & R. president, for violations of Rule 10b-5. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 353
F. Supp. 795, 799 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The district court found that Rhoades failed
to disclose material information concerning possible buyers of the stock prior
to an agreement to sell. Id. at 801. In a subsequent order, the court dismissed
the suit against M.S. & R. Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, No. 68-1048 (W.D. Pa Jan.
22, 1973). On first appeal, however, the Third Circuit held that the district
court did not make sufficient findings of fact to dismiss M.S. & R. Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 413 (3d Cir. 1974). On remand, Rochez asserted
that M.S. & R. was a controlling person and could be held secondarily liable.
Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 390 F. Supp. 470, 473-74 (W.D. Pa. 1974). The district
court concluded that M.S. & R. was not a controlling person and had acted in
good faith. Id. at 473. On a second appeal, the Third Circuit evaluated the leg-
islative history of the statute and other court decisions and determined that
M.S. & R. did not control Rhoades's activities and thus was not a controlling
person. Rochez Bros. 527 F.2d at 889-91. The court further stated that even as-
suming that M.S. & R. was a controlling person, Rochez did not prove inten-
tional participation on M.S. & R.'s part and thus the company could not be
held secondarily liable. Id. at 891.
63. Intentional participation does not necessarily have to be active partici-
pation. Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 890. In the case of inaction, it must be appar-
ent that the controlling person intentionally furthered the fraud or prevented
its discovery. Id.
64. I& at 880; see also Straub, 540 F.2d at 596 (company's authorization
and participation in scheme to defraud investor made company an intentional
participant); Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1318 (controlling person must knowingly use
controlled person to conduct fraud).
65. Some courts propose that because the standard of culpable (inten-
tional) participation is "ever-present in the securities laws," it is reasonable
that the controlling persons provisions include the same standard. Rochez
Bros., 527 F.2d at 885; see also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d
Cir. 1973) (arguing that use in 1933 Act of words like "cunning, manipulative,
deceptive .... and lack of good faith, and absence of language indicating liabil-
ity for negligent or non-negligent conduct" demonstrate intent that liability
would not attach under controlling persons provisions unless element of culpa-
bility was present).
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controlling person's actions.6 6 Such a result would transform
secondary liability into liability insurance, an approach Con-
gress explicitly rejected.67
Courts adopting the intentional participation standard also
argue that the Supreme Court has approved its use. In Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder,68 the United States Supreme Court sug-
gested that Congress intended section 20(a) of the 1934 Act to
require more than mere negligence to establish liability.69
Some lower courts have extended the Supreme Court's dicta to
support their contention that a controlling person must inten-
tionally participate in the securities fraud before a court can
find liability under either the 1933 or the 1934 Act.70
Additionally, courts emphasize that policy considerations
support the narrow interpretation of the controlling person
provisions.71 Unless intentional participation is the standard,
66. See Kersh v. General Council of Assemblies of God, 804 F.2d 546, 550
(9th Cir. 1986) (prohibiting imposition of liability despite finding that defend-
ant occupied influential position); see also Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 588
F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1978) (Congress adopted fiduciary standard proposed by the
House); Rochez Bros., 527 F.2d at 885 (asserting that "insurer's standard" re-
jected for "fiduciary standard").
67. The Senate's initial draft of the 1934 Act proposed an "insurer's" lia-
bility standard under which any corporate officer or director would be liable
for violations committed by the corporation regardless of personal fault. S.
REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATrVE HISTORY,
supra note 4, Item 17. The Senate advocated this standard because several
senators believed that if a controlling person could assert ignorance of the
fraud, investors would rarely recover damages and confidence in the markets
would not be restored. Id. Moreover, the Senate believed that if one of two
innocent persons must bear a loss, "he... who has the opportunity to learn
the truth and has allowed untruths to be... relied upon" should do so. Id.
The House, however, felt that the Senate's proposed standard would be unfair
and would not deter fraud, suggesting instead that holding controlling persons
to a lesser standard would not impede honest business and would improve the
standards of "honesty and fair dealings." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess.
5 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18. In choos-
ing between the two standards, the Senate accepted those imposed by the
House bill. Id.
68. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
69. The Supreme Court stated that § 20(a) of the 1934 Act requires a
"state-of-mind condition requiring something more than negligence." Id. at
209 n.28. Courts adopting the intentional participation standard frequently re-
fer to this dicta concerning § 20(a) but fail to acknowledge that the Supreme
Court also stated that § 15 of the 1933 Act requires mere negligence to allow
recovery from a controlling person. Id. at n.27.
70. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Harris, Upham & Co., 594 F.2d 388, 394 (4th
Cir.) (citing Ernst & Ernst to support claim that both controlling person provi-
sions require intentional participation), cert denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979); West-
lake v. Abrams, 504 F. Supp 337, 349 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (same).
71. For example, one commentator has argued that because controlling
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courts could hold controlling persons liable for virtually every
unlawful act of their past or present employees and partners,
regardless of the controlling person's complete lack of knowl-
edge or involvement.7 2 Allowing such a result is analogous to
imposing strict liability, a standard clearly rejected by Congress
in providing controlling persons with affirmative defenses.
Moreover, such a strict standard would be unfair and inade-
quate to deter future fraudulent activities. 73
B. THE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD OF SECONDARY LIABILITY
In contrast to those courts adopting the intentional partici-
pation standard, other courts have interpreted the controlling
person provisions as requiring only negligent involvement in
the fraud.74 For example, in G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Par-
tridge,75 the Fifth Circuit interpreted sections 15 and 20(a)
persons may not always know about the fraudulent activities subjecting them
to secondary liability, an element of uncertainty enters. See Comment, The
Eighth Circuit and Secondary Liability Under the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts-Metge v. Baehler, 19 CREIGHTON L. REv. 887, 929-30 (1986). Permitting
liability to rest on anything but intentional participation, therefore, would
shift the balance between the investor's protection and the legitimate opera-
tions of a business "intolerably toward investor protection." Id. at 930.
72. Senott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39-40 (7th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973); accord SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir.
1974) (without requiring knowing participation in the fraud, every link in
chain of command would be civilly liable for violations of inferior corporate
agents), cert denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
73. Cf. Comment, supra note 70, at 889 (arguing that liberal standard
would force controlling persons to insure customers against fraudulent activi-
ties perpetrated by their employees).
74. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
75. 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981). G.A. Thompson & Co., a broker-dealer,
sued Presley and others for a Rule 10b-5 violation. Presley, a director of a
mortgage loan company, asserted that he could not be a controlling person be-
cause Thompson had failed to show that Presley had participated in the fraud-
ulent activity. Id. at 957. The Fifth Circuit held that the proper elements to
consider included whether Presley had the requisite power to control and
whether Presley had satisfied the good faith defense. Id. at 958. Because Pres-
ley was a 24% stockholder, a director, and was involved in day-to-day coordina-
tion of the business, the court deemed Presley a controlling person. Id.
Regarding Presley's defense, the court found that Presley could not have su-
pervised or established a system of supervision over the controlled person en-
gaged in the fraud, but the court nevertheless held that because Presley could
have exercised his influence to mininize the chances of a Rule 10b-5 violation,
he had not acted in good faith. Id. at 959.
The court characterized the standard it used to hold Presley liable as reck-
lessness, id. at 959, but the standard is more accurately described as negli-
gence. The court apparently based its mischaracterization on Supreme Court
dicta stating that § 20(a) of the 1934 Act requires something more than negli-
gence to hold a controlling person liable. Id. (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
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broadly, holding a controlling person who could have deterred
the fraud secondarily liable.7 6 Under that standard, after the
complainant proved that the defendant was in a position to in-
fluence the controlled person,77 the burden shifted to the con-
trolling person to establish the affirmative defense provided by
Congress.78
Although agreeing that Congress did not intend to impose
"insurer's liability" on controlling persons,79 these courts assert
that Congress predicated secondary liability upon something
similar to a negligence standard. 0 The negligence approach
imposes liability on controlling persons who breach the duty of
care owed to third persons.8' If a person commits securities
fraud while under the supervision or influence of a controlling
person, courts presume that the controlling person failed to ex-
ercise due care.82 Courts do, however, permit the controlling
person to demonstrate non-negligent conduct to rebut the pre-
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.28 (1976)). The court viewed the failure to
maintain supervisory programs as an encouragement to the fraud and thus
held Presley liable. Id. at 959-60. Rather than permitting Presley to escape lia-
bility, the court apparently described his negligent conduct as reckless to con-
form with the Supreme Court's dicta.
76. Id at 959-60.
77. Id. at 958. Some courts hold that a controlling person's ability to influ-
ence is sufficient alone to find liability. See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738
(8th Cir. 1967) (indirect means of discipline or influence enough to impose lia-
bility), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Dyer v. Eastern Trust and Banking
Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 916 (N.D. Me. 1971) (prima facie case made out when
defendant shown to be one of 12 directors controlling corporation); cf. Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884 (3d Cir. 1975) (ability to influence is
relevant).
78. G.A. Thompson & Co., 636 F.2d at 960 (controlling persons must estab-
lish affirmative defenses); Terra Resources I v. Burgin, 664 F. Supp 82, 88
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (good faith is recognized defense); Drobbin v. Nicolet Instru-
ment Corp., 631 F. Supp. 860, 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (defendant can escape liabil-
ity by establishing statutory defense); accord Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d
1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir.) (§ 20(a) provides good faith defense), cert denied, 423
U.S. 1025 (1975).
79. See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d
1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980) (Congress rejected insurer's standard (citing H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1933)).
80. Negligence is defined as a failure to do something that a reasonable
person would do under similar circumstances or the doing of something that a
reasonably prudent person would not do under the circumstances. See W.
PROSSER & P. KEETON, TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
81. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 17. The House Report accompanying the
1933 Act noted that the standard adopted required controlling persons to use
"reasonable care" and "diligence." H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY, supra note 4, Item 19.
82. See, e.g., Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890, 915-16
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sumption of liability. 3
Courts advocating the negligence approach to secondary li-
ability8 argue that the intentional participation standard con-
flicts with Congress's intent because it improperly forces the
complainant to disprove the controlling person's affirmative de-
fenses. They suggest that Congress intended to place the bur-
den of establishing an affirmative defense on the controlling
person.8 5 Consistent with that intention, the negligence stan-
dard requires the controlling person to establish an affirmative
defense to defeat liability.8 6 It does not, unlike the intentional
participation standard, impose liability only if the complainant
disproves the controlling person's defenses.
Courts also assert that the intentional participation stan-
dard contravenes Congress's intent to protect the public.8 7 Be-
cause that standard imposes secondary liability only for
(N.D. Me. 1971) (person in position of influence is prima facie controlling per-
son and deemed to have participated in acts causing the loss).
83. See Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1968) (defendant
exculpated with evidence that he did not know, nor could have known, of the
alleged misstatement or omission). Under the negligence standard, it is not
sufficient for the defendant to demonstrate lack of participation or knowledge
of the fraudulent activities. Rather the defendant must show diligence and
due care. See Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., 608 F.2d 187, 194-95 (5th
Cir. 1979) (upholding district court's ruling because defendant failed to "'dili-
gently enforce a proper system of supervision and control' ") (quoting
DelPorte v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 548 F.2d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); DelPorte v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 548 F.2d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (defendant failed to maintain and enforce a control
system).
84. The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits reject the intentional participa-
tion standard. Although their opinions are sometimes ambiguous, those courts
generally agree the complainant first must prove that the defendant occupies a
position of control. The defendant must then respond, asserting an affirmative
defense, which requires disproving something akin to negligence. See Metge v.
Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 631 (8th Cir. 1985) (simply stating intentional participa-
tion standard is erroneous for "reasons announced... in [G.A. Thompson &
Co.]"), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 1072 (1986); G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Par-
tridge, 636 F.2d 945, 959 (5th Cir. 1981) (controlling person must demonstrate
implementation of reasonable system of supervision); Richardson v. MacAr-
thur, 451 F.2d 35, 41-42 (10th Cir. 1971) (officers must act with due care and
adopt precautionary measures to escape liability).
85. Note, supra note 25, at 1403-04 (intentional participation standard re-
quires plaintiff to negate affirmative defenses, preventing controlling persons
from demonstrating good faith and noninducement elements).
86. Cf. SEC v. Geon Indus., 531 F.2d 39, 54 (2d Cir. 1976) (after complain-
ant proved company was controlling person and company demonstrated rea-
sonable care, court did not impose liability).
87. See infra text accompanying notes 103-13.
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intentional involvement,8 8 a controlling person in a position to
discover fraudulent conduct will have a strong incentive to re-
lax supervision and remain ignorant of the controlled person's
activities.8 9 By doing so, the controlling person prevents a find-
ing of fraudulent intent and circumvents liability. A negligence
standard, in contrast, prevents controlling persons from escap-
ing liability based on lack of knowledge and encourages mean-
ingful supervision that protects the public from fraud.
III. ROCHEZ BROS., G.A. THOMPSON & CO., AND
UNIFORM SECONDARY LIABILITY
STANDARDS
Although courts apply different standards in determining a
controlling person's liability, most courts agree that whichever
standard is chosen, that standard should be used under both the
1933 and 1934 Acts.90 Courts primarily use either the inten-
tional participation standard, which demands proof that the de-
fendant intentionally participated in the fraud,91 or the
negligence standard, which only requires proof that the defend-
ant was a controlling person but allows the defendant to estab-
lish an affirmative defense.9 2 Because neither standard is
accurate under both Acts, courts should adopt different stan-
dards for each controlling person provision.
A. THE INTENTIONAL PARTICIPATION STANDARD:
INADEQUATE UNDER BOTH SECURITIES ACTS
The intentional participation standard 93 provides a plausi-
ble interpretation of the congressional intent underlying the
controlling person provisions.94 Seeking to prohibit liability
88. See supra notes 60-64.
89. One court has noted that the intentional participation standard would
"give blessing to a hear-no-evil, see-no-evil approach," violating the statutes'
remedial purposes. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 297 F. Supp. 1165, 1212 (D.
Md. 1968), aff'd in par rev'd in part, 422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970), cert de-
nied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). In contrast, a negligence standard would prevent es-
cape from liability for lack of knowledge. See G.A. Thompson & Co., 636 F.2d
at 959.
90. See, e.g., Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d
1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980) (controlling person provisions are analogous and
should be interpreted similarly).
91. See supra notes 60-73 and acc6mpanying text.
92. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text.
93. See Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 884-86 (3d Cir. 1975); supra
notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
94. The legislative history concerning Congress's intent in adopting the
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based solely on a controlling person's influential position, Con-
gress stated in the legislative history that more than mere con-
trol must be present to impose liability.95 Because requiring
proof of intentional participation precludes liability based solely
on a position of control,96 the intentional participation standard
conforms to congressional intent.
The intentional participation standard, however, contra-
venes the statute's plain language.97 Sections 15 and 20(a) man-
date that the complainant prove the defendant was a
1933 and 1934 Acts is ambiguous and arguably supports either the narrow or
broad interpretation of the controlling person provisions. See, e.g., Note, supra
note 11, at 1012 (provisions are susceptible to varying interpretations). Other
considerations, however, suggest the broad construction is a more accurate in-
terpretation of §§ 15 and 20(a). See infra notes 135-76 and accompanying text.
95. Congress thought it unfair to impose secondary liability solely because
a controlling person possessed authority over employees and has deeper pock-
ets. Representative Hollister noted that no one would want to do anything
"which would make it easy to attack an honest man under this bill merely be-
cause he may have wealth." 78 CONG. REc. 8094-95 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 8. Consequently, the Senate amended
§ 15 of the 1933 Act, noting that the "mere existence of control is not.., a
basis for liability." 78 CONG. REC. 8669 (1934) (Sen. Fletcher's explanation of
amendments to the 1933 Act), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
4, Item 10. Unless control is "effectively exercised" to bring about the fraud,
the controlling person cannot be liable. Id.
96. See Orloff v. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1987) (owner of in-
vestment corporation escaped liability because there was no evidence of partic-
ipation in the fraud); Kersh v. General Council of the Assemblies of God, 804
F.2d 546, 551-53 (9th Cir. 1986) (church headquarters deemed in control of lo-
cal church, but not liable because no evidence of intentional participation);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 1981) (company held
liable for employee's conduct only after finding company was participant in
the fraud), cert denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 685
(6th Cir. 1981) (director not liable because no evidence of participation); Lanza
v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973) (same); Sennott v. Rodman
& Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39-40 (7th Cir.) (partners in brokerage firm not liable
because they had no knowledge of the fraud), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973).
97. Statutory analysis always begins with an examination of the language
of the statute. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685
(1985) (axiomatic that starting point in every case involving construction of
statute is language itself). Courts only consult legislative history when the
statutory expression is ambiguous. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6 n.4 (1980).
Moreover, courts should be reluctant to resort to legislative history when it is
used to support a result contrary to the statute's express terms. See ACLU v.
Federal Communications Bd., 823 F.2d 1554, 1560, 1564 (D.C. Cir. 1987); accord
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976) (in construing securities
acts, "[a]scertainment of congressional intent with respect to the standard of
liability created by a particular section of the Acts must.., rest primarily on
the language of that section"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 756 (1973) (starting point in every case involving construction of stat-
ute is language itself).
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controlling person; the controlling person then may assert an
affirmative defense to defeat liability. 98 By requiring evidence
demonstrating an intent to further the fraud, the courts force
the complainant to prove negligence or bad faith, the affirma-
tive defenses Congress gave to controlling persons. Courts using
the intentional participation standard therefore place the de-
fendant's burden on the complainant, rendering the defenses
superfluous. 9 9
Moreover, the intentional participation standard makes the
entire controlling person provision unnecessary. 100 If the con-
trolling person intentionally participated in the fraud, either di-
rectly or indirectly, that person could be held primarily liable
for the violation.10 1 Thus, invoking the controlling person pro-
vision would be unnecessary. 0 2 Congress would not have en-
acted a separate provision to impose secondary liability on a
controlling person if the person also could be found primarily
liable.
Perhaps more importantly, the intentional participation
standard undermines the central purpose of the securities
acts.10 3 Congress provided investors a cause of action for losses
98. Although the intentional participation standard interferes with the af-
firmative defenses, see supra text accompanying notes 84-86, courts using the
standard still note that Congress provided these defenses. See, e.g., SEC v. Sa-
voy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913
(1979).
99. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
100. One of the primary canons of statutory interpretation is to avoid a
construction of a statute that renders any part unnecessary. See Fidelity Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163 (1982) (construction of
legislation so as to render part of it nugatory "'offend[s] the well-settled rule
that all parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect' ") (quoting Ameri-
can Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981)).
101. Under § 11 of the 1933 Act, for example, a person purchasing stock
may sue any person who took part in the preparation of a registration state-
ment containing material misstatements. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1982). If the con-
trolling person was a "culpable participant" and intentionally furthered the
fraud by aiding in enclosing the false statements in the registration statement,
that person can be held primarily liable under § 11 and there would be no
need to invoke § 15. Cf. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d
680, 689 (5th Cir. 1971) (defendant held liable under § 11 for intentional partic-
ipation in the fraudulent registration statement); Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand,
457 F. Supp. 879, 894 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (requiring intent to defraud would mean
§ 20(a) would apply only when controlling person's primary liability can be
shown), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982).
102. Cf. Hill York Corp., 448 F.2d at 689, 694-95 (holding defendant both
secondarily and directly liable for participation in fraudulent transaction).
103. See supra notes 1-2.
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caused by fraudulent activities' °4 to restore investor confidence
in the integrity and stability of the securities markets.10 5 Re-
quiring proof that the controlling person orchestrated or inten-
tionally furthered the fraud imposes an evidentiary burden
virtually impossible to satisfy.106 In most cases the investor
deals exclusively with the controlled person and will not have
met or even dealt indirectly with the controlling person.10 7 As
a result, it is difficult for an investor to uncover proof that the
controlling person intended to defraud her,108 and proof that
the controlling person only knew of the fraud will be insuffi-
cient to impose liability.10 9 Requiring proof of intentional par-
104. See generally 78 CONG. REC. 7866 (1934) (securities acts endeavor to re-
move possibility of future fraud and to protect small banks and investors from
losses if fraud occurs), reprinted in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item
8. But see In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., [1985-1986 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,461, at 92,816 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (securities acts are
primarily intended to deter fraudulent conduct, not to insure compensation to
injured parties).
105. 77 CONG. REc. 2914 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Greenwood), reprinted in
1 LEGiSLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 7; see supra note 4.
106. Frequently, the controlled person is a salesperson or broker who
either disappears or has only limited financial resources, leaving the investor
without compensation for the loss. Cf. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 993
(7th Cir.) (after conducting fraudulent transactions, president committed sui-
cide), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972). Thus the investor prefers to sue the
party with the "deepest pockets." See Note, supra note 29, at 824. Congress,
however, specifically stated it did not want actions to be brought solely be-
cause of a controlling person's wealth. See supra note 95.
107. Cf. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, 448 F.2d 680, 685 (5th
Cir. 1971) (defendants orchestrated nationwide franchise operation but did not
actually conduct the fraudulent transactions).
108. Plaintiffs cannot be expected to have personal knowledge of the facts
constituting the wrongdoings in securities fraud. Wool v. Tandem Computers,
818 F.2d 1433, 1442 (9th Cir. 1987); see Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F. Supp. 1491, 1495
(E.D.N.Y. 1986) (controlled person's relationship to controlling person is better
known to controlling person than to complainant); Note, supra note 29, at 842
(it is much easier to "screen the adequacy of a broker-dealer's supervisory pro-
cedures than it is to probe the corporate mind").
109. For example, in Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981), defend-
ant Dinkler was a director of Daniel Boone Fried Chicken. As a promotion in
the issuance of stock, the company issued a press release that grossly over-
stated Daniel Boone's position in the market and its future prospects. 1d. at
673. Dinkler read the release and staged a signing for a promotional picture
with other directors. The company became insolvent and Dinkler was sued as
a controlling person. He defended by arguing that he merely scanned the re-
lease and was unaware that he was a director. Id. at 674. The court held Din-
kler could not be liable because there was no showing that he exercised any
control over the corporation or the transaction. Id. at 684. For discussion of
the court's mandate that conscious intent must be proved, see supra notes 60-
64 and accompanying text.
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
ticipation, therefore, effectively shields a controlling person
from liability and prevents investors from recovering losses.
The intentional participation standard also fails to deter se-
curities fraud, another fundamental purpose underlying the
controlling person provisions."i 0 To avoid liability under this
standard, controlling persons will attempt to show that they
could not have intentionally furthered the fraud. Demonstrat-
ing a lack of knowledge of the fraudulent transaction would
provide persuasive evidence that the controlling person did not
intend to defraud an investor."' Thus, the less involved the
controlling person is in the controlled person's activities, the
less likely a court will find that the controlling person had the
requisite intent. 1 2 Rather than promoting close supervision of
employees to ensure compliance with the securities laws, the
intentional participation standard encourages a controlling per-
son to remain ignorant of all transactions, thereby avoiding sec-
ondary liability. 1 3  The intentional participation standard,
therefore, although arguably consistent with some legislative
history, is seriously flawed and should not be used to determine
a controlling person's liability under either the 1933 or the 1934
Acts.
110. See supra notes 1-2.
111. See Hermn, 663 F.2d at 684.
112. Failing to maintain a reasonable system of supervision does not rise to
the level of intentional participation. Kersh v. General Council of Assemblies
of God, 804 F.2d 546, 551-53 (9th Cir. 1986); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d
1129, 1135 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
113. In the context of a Rule 10b-5 case, for example, one court noted that
a firm should not be shielded from compensating victims who suffered losses
from reckless conduct because such a result encourages partners to immunize
themselves from liability by constructing a "Chinese wall" between them-
selves and their employees. Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 184 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982). The court in Sharp was concerned
that requiring partners to be knowing participants was a powerful disincentive
to supervise employees. Id. The same court, however, employed the inten-
tional participation standard to determine a controlling person's liability. Id.
at 185. Yet the same arguments that support the use of a recklessness stan-
dard in Rule 10b-5 cases should apply to some cases arising under the control-
ling person provisions. Requiring a controlling person to be an intentional
participant in the fraud encourages the controlling person to remain ignorant
of the potentially fraudulent acts of her employees. See Paul F. Newton & Co.
v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1985); see also Note,
supra note 11, at 1028 (policy considerations with respect to liability under
Rule 10b-5 and controlling person provisions are closely related).
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B. THE NEGLIGENCE STANDARD: ADEQUATE UNDER THE 1933
ACT, INADEQUATE UNDER THE 1934 ACT
The G.A. Thompson & Co." 4 negligence standard provides
a more plausible interpretation of the controlling person provi-
sions than the intentional participation standard."5 The legis-
lative history demonstrates that Congress intended controlling
persons to act as fiduciaries" 6 and as a result imposed a duty of
care on them under both Acts to exercise their influence to de-
tect and prevent fraudulent activities by controlled persons"i 17
The negligence standard, which imposes secondary liability on
controlling persons who reasonably could have discovered the
controlled person's fraud,"" comports with this duty to exercise
care and competence." 9 Because the controlling person provi-
sions have unique affirmative defenses and the 1933 and 1934
Acts regulate different activities, 2 0 the negligence standard is
consistent with the standard Congress intended under the 1933
Act but fails under the 1934 Act.
114. 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981); see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying
text.
115. See 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & CoMMoDI-
TIES FRAUD § 5.10(410) (1986) (broader standard is better interpretation of con-
trolling persons provisions).
116. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEGISLA-
TIvE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18.
117. GA. Thompson & Co., 636 F.2d at 959. Courts implement this stan-
dard by mandating programs of supervision. See Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts
of Am., 608 F.2d 187, 194 (5th Cir. 1979) (president who failed to implement
proper system of supervision held liable), aff'd on rehg in pertinent part va-
cated and remanded in part, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980); DelPorte v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 548 F.2d 1149, 1154 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (without
supervisory programs, company held liable under controlling persons provi-
sions); Campbell v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., [1984-1985
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 92,082, at 91,414 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(evidence of failure to supervise is prima facie case for liability).
Because investors generally come to a firm and not to a specific individual,
courts often impose on controlling persons an affirmative obligation to prevent
controlled persons from using the firm's prestige to defraud the investing pub-
lic. See Holloway v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690, 696 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding de-
fendant brokerage firm liable to investors who believed broker was working
with firm in transaction); see also Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce
Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980) (investors relying on firm's prestige,
rather than indvidual broker, may hold firm accountable for losses due to
fraud).
118. G.A Thompson & Co., 636 F.2d at 959; see supra text accompanying
notes 74-89.
119. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted in 2 LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18.
120. See supra note 6 and text accompanying notes 18-29.
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1. Application of a Negligence Standard Under Section 15 of
the 1933 Act
In addition to the legislative history indicating that the
negligence standard is appropriate, the plain meaning of section
15 of the 1933 Act requires the use of a reasonable person stan-
dard.121 Section 15 holds a controlling person liable for the con-
trolled person's fraudulent activities unless the controlling
person lacked knowledge of the fraud or could not reasonably
have known of the fraudulent conduct.122 Under section 15,
therefore, a controlling person must act as a reasonable person
in a similar position would act to deter, discover, and prevent
fraudulent transactions by controlled persons.m Under the in-
tentional participation standard, however, a controlling person
could escape liability, although grossly negligent, if the com-
plainant lacks proof of intentional participation in the fraud.2A
Such a result contradicts section 15's language, which unam-
biguously imposes liability if a controlling person reasonably
could have known of the fraud.125
The negligence standard also deters fraudulent securities
transactions more effectively than the intentional participation
standard.126 Imposing secondary liability on controlling persons
who could have known of the fraud, rather than only for inten-
tional participation, creates a greater incentive for controlling
persons to supervise closely all employees to discover and halt
quickly any fraudulent activity. 2 7 If the controlling person
121. See supra note 6.
122. See supra note 6.
123. Congress noted that "[d]irectors should assume the responsibility of
directing and ... should be held responsible to the unsuspecting public for
their neglect." H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933) (emphasis ad-
ded), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18; cf. Demarco
v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1968) (defendant not liable with evidence of
reasonable care and prudence).
124. See Sennott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 37 (7th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973); infra note 126.
125. See supra notes 6, 94.
126. Allowing a brokerage firm to avoid secondary liability simply by
showing that it was not an intentional participant would allow it to escape lia-
bility by showing ignorance. Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank,
630 F.2d 1111, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980). Instead, rather than merely evidencing ig-
norance of the fraud, the negligence standard requires a controlling person to
demonstrate an effective system of supervision. Id. at 1119; see Hecht v. Har-
ris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 439 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (" 'most effective
means for insuring adequate supervision is to impose liability for injury result-
ing from its absence' ") (quoting Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp. 724, 733 (E.D.
Pa. 1966)), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970).
127. In Sennott, the son of a partner in a securities firm conducted fraudu-
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does not have a system of supervision to identify fraudulent
conduct and the court determines, that a reasonable person
would have implemented and maintained such a program, the
negligence standard will impose liability.1s
2. Application of a Negligence Standard Under Section 20(a)
of the 1934 Act
Although well-suited for the 1933 Act, the negligence ap-
proach is inappropriate for section 20(a) of the 1934 Act. 2 9 Sec-
tion 20(a) was intended to impose secondary liability on a
controlling person for the fraudulent acts of controlled persons
unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not in-
duce the fraud.130 By equating section 20(a)'s bad faith lan-
guage with a negligence standard, courts erroneously interpret
the affirmative defense of section 20(a)13' because bad faith dif-
fers from mere negligence. Bad faith requires a showing of in-
tentional or reckless conduct whereas negligence simply
requires proof of conduct lacking due care.132 Thus, applying a
negligence standard under section 20(a) allows courts to hold
controlling persons liable even when there is no evidence of
bad faith, a result not contemplated by Congress.
lent transactions under the name of his father's firm. 474 F.2d at 33-34.
Although the firm discovered the fraud, it failed to stop the fraudulent activi-
ties. Id. at 37-39. The Seventh Circuit did not impose liability on the firm as a
controlling person because it did not participate in the fraud. Id. at 39-40. Had
the firm been threatened with liability, it may have more actively attempted
to stop the fraudulent transaction. Indeed, two Supreme Court Justices
thought that because the controlling person provisions are remedial, they
should be construed more liberally than the lower courts permit. Sennott v.
Rodman & Renshaw, 414 U.S. 926, 931 (1973) (Douglas & Blackmun, JJ., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari). The Justices further noted that firms
should take precautionary measures to prevent losses to investors. Id.
128. See supra notes 74-89.
129. See Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegler & Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 94,133, at 94,551 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (controlling person "cannot
be held accountable for that which it did not intend, nurture ... or otherwise
induce"); cf. Smith v. Christie, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,828, at 90,121 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (if adequate system of supervision is imple-
mented, mere failure to uncover alleged securities violations does not demon-
strate bad faith).
130. See supra note 6.
131. Cf. Gould v. American Hawaiin S.S. Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 860 n.7 (D.
Del. 1972) (difference between scienter requirement in Rule 10b-5 and good
faith defense under § 20(a) is merely a shift in burden of proof from plaintiff
to defendant).
132. See Note, sup note 11, at 1025-26 (without indication from Congress,
lack of good faith in the context of § 20(a) means more than lack of reasonable
care).
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Moreover, distinguishing good faith from bad faith is a sub-
jective process, requiring a variable standard that evaluates
each controlling person's conduct based on the facts of the
case.133 A negligence standard, however, is objective, allowing
the use of a uniform standard in which the controlling person's
conduct is compared to a reasonable person in similar circum-
stances.' M Applying a negligence standard under section 20(a)
of the 1934 Act, therefore, disregards the affirmative defense's
plain meaning 35 by imposing an objective standard to evaluate
a controlling person's conduct, when the language of the statute
requires use of a subjective standard.
C. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES REQUIRE DIFFERENT STANDARDS
TO- PROPERLY'IMPLEMENT CONTROLLING PERSONS
PROVISIONS
Courts enforcing sections 15 and 20(a) assume the provi-
sions are similar and require identical interpretations. 6 The
controlling person provisions, however, are significantly differ-
ent in content.137 Few courts recognize that Congress may not
133. See supra note 50.
134. See supra note 80.
135. See supra notes 97, 100. Another problem with using the negligence
standard under § 20(a) of the 1934 Act is that it may allow recovery when a
court has determined that a complainant should not recover under the sub-
stantive provision violated. For example, in a Rule 10b-5 action, courts use a
scienter standard to determine primary liability. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979). If the complainant cannot recover
from the person who primarily violated Rule 10b-5 because evidence of scien-
ter is lacking, then allowing the complainant to recover under the controlling
person provision merely because there is evidence of negligence would under-
mine Rule 10b-5. See Note, supra note 11, at 1027-28.
136. See G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir.
1981) (courts should give §§ 15 and 20(a) the same interpretation); Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1115 (5th Cir. 1980)
(controlling person provisions are analogous and should be interpreted simi-
larly); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673 (5th Cir. 1980) (§ 15 and 20(a) of se-
curities acts should be interpreted identically); SEC v. Management Dynamics,
515 F.2d 801, 812 (2d Cir. 1975) (Q 20(a) is analogue of § 15); Haynes v. Ander-
son & Strudwick, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 1303, 1309-10 n.5 (E.D. Va. 1981) ('The
availability of controlling person liability is the same under either § 15 or
§ 20(a), despite the variations in language.").
For another suggestion of why courts are unable to develop a uniform
standard, see Comment, Secondary Liability of Controlling Persons Under the
Securities Acts: Toward an Improved Analysis, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1345, 1352-
53 (1978) (suggesting that the need to rely on unique factual nature in each
case has prevented development of universal standard).
137. Another important distinction between the two controlling person
provisions is that § 15 of the 1933 Act imposes secondary liability only for vio-
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have intended the same secondary liability standard to apply to
both securities acts. 38
To impose secondary liability correctly on a controlling
person, courts should apply different standards of liability
under each securities act.139 Under section 15 of the 1933 Act,
courts should base liability on a broad negligence standard,140
whereas under section 20(a) of the 1934 Act, courts should use a
narrower recklessness standard.141 Despite these differentiated
standards for establishing secondary liability, the first element
of the test remains the same: the complainant must demon-
strate that the defendant occupied a position of control or influ-
ence.1' It is with the second element-the affirmative
defense-that the standards differ. To defeat liability under
section 15, the controlling person must establish nonnegligent
conduct.143 Under section 20(a), however, the defendant need
only prove good faith by evidencing that the conduct at issue
lations of §§ 11 and 12 of that Act, while § 20(a) of the 1934 Act imposes liabil-
ity for virtually any violation of that Act. See supra note 6; 2 A. BROMBERG &
L. LOwENFEIS, supra note 115, § 5.10(410). But see Ferrara & Sanger, supra
note 11, at 1012 (difference between two controlling person provisions is not
significant).
138. See 2 A. BROMBERG & L. LOwENFEiz, supra note 115, § 5.10(436) (no
judicial focus or analysis on difference between controlling person provisions).
But see Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-09 n.28 (1976) (noting
that § 15 of 1933 Act "allow[s] recovery for negligent conduct," but that "[e]ach
of the provisions of the 1934 Act that expressly create civil liability ... con-
tains a state-of-mind condition requiring something more than negligence"
(citing § 20(a) of 1934 Act as example)).
Although courts do not focus on the difference between the provisions,
some commentators suggest the controlling person provisions are quite differ-
ent and the affirmative defenses require different standards of proof. See, e.g.,
3 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1747 (1934 Act provides "seemingly readier defense
than the 1933 Act").
139. The Supreme Court has held that the 1933 and 1934 Acts need not be
interpreted identically even if both use the exact same words. See 1 A. BROM-
BERG & L. LOwENFELS, supra note 114, § 4.6(312) (arguing that definition of
security could be more broadly interpreted under 1934 Act than under 1933
Act). Compare Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (predispute agreement
violates § 14 of 1933 Act) with Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 107
S. Ct. 2332, 2339 (1987) (some arbitration agreements are valid under § 29(a) of
1934 Act). But see Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 11, at 1012 (controlling per-
son provisions should be construed identically).
140. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 208-09 n.27 (§ 15 allows recovery for negli-
gent conduct). For discussion of the negligence standard applied to § 15, see
supra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
141. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 209 n.28 (§ 20(a) requires state of mind of
something more than negligence).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
143. For the definition of negligence, see supra note 80.
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was not reckless.1 "
Requiring a controlling person to prove due care under the
1933 Act to satisfy the objective reasonable person standard is
neither novel nor unreasonable 45 because the language of sec-
tion 15 anticipates the use of a negligence standard.14 6 Con-
gress assumed that a reasonable person in a controlling position
would attempt to discover fraudulent activities and endeavor to
halt the conduct to prevent any loss to investors.14 7 If a person
reasonably could have known of the fraud but did not, that per-
son was negligent and courts should impose liability regardless
of the lack of actual knowledge.148
The broad purpose of the 1933 Act also requires that a con-
trolling person act reasonably. Congress enacted the 1933 Act
primarily to regulate initial stock offerings' 49 and to protect in-
144. Recklessness involves the state of mind of an actor who pays no re-
gard to the possibility or probability of injury that could come about, or though
seeing probable consequences, continues despite that knowledge. W. PROSSER
& P. KEETON, TORTS § 34, at 213-14 (5th ed. 1984). Recklessness requires more
than mere negligence. Id., § 8, at 36; see infra note 179.
145. The House Report accompanying H.R. 5480 and § 15 discussed civil lia-
bilities provisions incorporated into the bill as requiring a negligence standard:
The character of civil liabilities imposed by this bill . .. consists of a
requirement that all those responsible for statements upon the face of
which the public is solicited to invest its money shall be held to stan-
dards like those imposed by law upon a fiduciary .... Directors
should assume the responsibility of directing .... [and] they should be
held responsible to the unsuspecting public for their neglect.
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933) (emphasis added), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18. Additionally, the report noted
that "[t]he demands of this bill call for the assumption of no impossible bur-
den" on the controlling person. Id.
146. See supra note 6. Commentators also assert that the best construction
of the 1933 Act allows an escape from liability only if the controlling person
exercised the reasonable care of a person of ordinary prudence. See Note,
supra note 29, at 839-41. See also Folk, Civil Liabilities under the Federal Se-
curities Acts: The BarChris Case, 55 VA. L. REv. 199, 216-24 (1969) (suggesting
that controlling person under § 15 of 1933 Act must exercise reasonable degree
of care).
147. Congress believed that holding persons involved in securities transac-
tions to standards of "honesty, care, and competence" would cause corporate
organization and practice to change in a way that would protect innocent in-
vestors from fraud. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933), reprinted
in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18.
148. For example, a director who negligently made false statements regard-
ing a company's financial condition in a press release was not held liable be-
cause the court applied an intentional participation standard. Herm v.
Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684-85 (6th Cir. 1981). If the court had used a negli-
gence standard instead, the director would have been liable, resulting in a
change in corporate practice that would prevent such negligence in the future.
149. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, which the controlling person provision
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vestors in those transactions5 0 by requiring persons proposing
the issue to distribute detailed information regarding the char-
acter of the securities offered.15 ' Investors rely on the accuracy
of the information disclosed to appraise realistically the merits
of the offering 5 2 and risk loss if due care is not taken to assure
the information's accuracy. 53 Holding controlling persons to a
negligence standard provides a strong incentive for the issuer to
verify all information related to the offering,154 which in turn
promotes investor confidence in the securities markets and de-
ters fraudulent activities. Thus, the negligence standard fulfills
Congress's objectives in enacting the 1933 Act.15 5
Furthermore, imposing a negligence standard under section
15 of the 1933 Act would not unfairly burden a controlling per-
son by lowering the threshold for suits asserting secondary lia-
bility because the 1933 Act contains other procedural
incorporates, however, is not limited to new issues and distributions despite its
prominent mention of the prospectus. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982). See also
supra note 1.
150. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 n.10 (1953); Bush v.
Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Responsibilities of Corpo-
rate Officers & Directors Under Federal Securities Laws, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) No. 1178, pt. II, 201, at 23 (May 21, 1986) (2d ed.) ("The keystone of
the Securities Act of 1933 is the accurate disclosure of facts that will place po-
tential securities purchasers on a par with persons seeking to issue securities
and sell them to the public.").
151. Information required in a registration statement includes the name of
the issuer, the general character of business transacted by the issuer, state-
ments of capitalization, the specific purpose and amounts devoted to the pur-
pose for which the security to be offered is to supply funds, and the estimated
net proceeds to be derived from the security offering. See 15 U.S.C. § 77aa
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (schedule of information required in registration state-
ment); SEC Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1986) (instructions for filing
forms under securities acts).
152. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933) (items required to be
disclosed are indispensable to accurate judgment on securities), reprinted in 2
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 18.
153. See Frankenstein v. McCrory Corp., 425 F. Supp. 762, 763 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (investors experienced significant losses following inaccurate disclosure);
see also Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 672 (6th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs purchased
or received stock in merger following inaccurate disclosure).
154. See 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 115, § 2.3(800):
It makes sense for a higher standard of care (by way of the very nar-
row defense) to be imposed on those who are responsible for the prep-
aration of a registration statement, since the latter is the heart of the
public disclosure system for public offerings, and is widely relied on
both directly and indirectly, e.g. through the component prospectus.
Id.; see also Globus v. Law Research, Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969)
(1933 Act was designed to deter negligence by providing penalty for those who
fail in their duties), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
155. For the objectives of Congress, see supra notes 1-2.
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protections that deter colorless claims.1 56 For example, section
13 provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing actions
against a controlling person.157 This provision assures that lia-
bility is not imposed after a lapse of time makes it more diffi-
cult to produce evidence proving compliance with the
reasonable person standard. 5 8 Additionally, if a court consid-
ers a complaint frivolous, it can require the complainant to post
a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees. 5 9 If the litigation
goes forward, the court will, in certain circumstances, assess
costs at the conclusion of the litigation. 60 These protections
ensure that using a negligence standard, which makes it easier
for complainants to state a cause of action, will not open the
door to nonmeritorious claims, which would subject the con-
trolling person to the cost and embarrassment of defending
against them.
Although Congress intended a negligence standard to apply
under the 1933 Act, a stricter standard should be required
156. Congress regarded these restrictions on private damages actions as sig-
nificant. When amending the 1933 Act, Senator Fletcher indicated that the
procedural protections adopted were "the most important of all." 78 CONG.
REC. 8669 (1934), reprinted in 4 LEGiSLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 10.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1982). Both §§ 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act require the
complainant to bring actions within one year after discovering the untrue
statement or after such discovery should have been made through the exercise
of reasonable diligence. Id.
158. Cf. Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 682-83 (6th Cir. 1981) (upholding
summary judgment against defrauded investor because complaint filed 15
months after one-year limitation period expired). In addition to avoiding
problems associated with stale evidence, a one-year statute of limitations re-
lieves a controlling person from the worry of possible lawsuits. See Wilson v.
Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 275 n.34 (1985) (potential defendants' ability to know
.when they are free from worry of litigation is important policy consideration
for statutes of limitations).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1982).
160. If the court believes that a suit or a defense under the controlling per-
son provisions is without merit, it will assess costs and fees. See, e.g., Zissu v.
Bear, Stearns & Co., 805 F.2d 75, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1986) (ordering plaintiff to pay
costs for what court considered frivolous suit); see also Henkel, Codfication-
Civil Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAw. 866, 871 (1967)
(discussing courts' discretion in mandating payment of costs).
Controlling persons are further protected because the complainant does.
not get relief simply by proving the existence of false and misleading state-
ments. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 325 n.2 (1979). The com-
plainant must also prove injury and damages. Id. The controlling person,
therefore, will not be secondarily liable, even for gross negligence, if the com-
plainant does not prove damages. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970) (suit dismissed because plaintiff failed to demonstrate that securities
would be worth more if registration statement did not contain material
omissions).
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before liability is imposed on a controlling person under the
1934 Act.' 6 ' The language of section 20(a) of the 1934 Act im-
poses liability unless the controlling person proves good faith.
Because a controlling person can simultaneously act negligently
and in good faith,162 the negligence standard is inadequate for
the 1934 Act.
In addition to the language of section 20(a), numerous dif-
ferences between the Acts make a negligence standard imprac-
tical under the 1934 Act and suggest that the 1934 Act
anticipates a narrower standard.163 The 1934 Act primarily reg-
ulates the trading market rather than the new issue market
and attempts to protect investors from fraudulent transactions
on the securities exchanges. 164 Unlike the 1933 Act, which reg-
ulates the relatively few initial offerings,165 the 1934 Act regu-
lates millions of daily transactions executed by thousands of
controlled persons. 6 6 Most transactions regulated by the 1934
Act are virtually impossible for a controlling person to super-
vise closely.167 Consequently, given the vast number of transac-
tions regulated and the impracticability of close supervision,
holding a controlling person to a standard of recklessness under
section 20(a) imposes a realistic standard of care that does not
unfairly burden controlling persons.
Not only do the 1933 and 1934 Acts regulate different activ-
ities, but exposure to secondary liability is far greater under
161. 1 L. Loss, supra note 1, at 1747. Although §§ 20(a) and 15 are similar
in that both provisions hold a controlling person liable, the 1934 Act gives the
controlling person a defense that is easier to satisfy. Id.
162. Some courts distinguish between bad faith and "mere negligence" by
noting that a person can be both negligent and act in good faith. See, e.g., Sen-
nott v. Rodman & Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 40 n.5 (7th Cir. 1973) (inferring that
brokerage firm may have been negligent in failing to discover the fraud, but
that firm did not act in bad faith or induce the fraud), cert denied, 414 U.S.
926 (1975).
163. See supra note 2.
164. S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLA.
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, Item 17; see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (1934 Act focuses on securities exchanges and
over-the-counter market, whereas 1933 Act mandates disclosure of facts re-
garding securities themselves).
165. For example, during the months of May, June, and July in 1987, there
were only 1135 initial offerings. 46 SEC MONTHLY STATISTICAL REV. No. 9, at
17, table M-370 (Sept. 1987). For the same months, 14,752,391,000 shares of
stock were traded on the securities exchanges. Id. at 9, table M-120.
166. Id. at 9, table M-120.
167. See Henricksen v. Henricksen, 640 F.2d 880, 884-87 (7th Cir.) (stock-
holder's husband-stockbroker fraudulently mismanaged stock accounts and
falsified documents), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1097 (1981); infra note 171.
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section 20(a) than under section 15 of the 1933 Act. 68 Section
20(a) incorporates the 1934 Act's broad antifraud provision and
imposes liability for all varieties of fraudulent conduct prac-
ticed by any person in the purchase or sale of a security.169 Sec-
tion 15, however, provides a cause of action only for violations
of sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, two limited provisions. 70
Although a controlling person could implement a system to en-
sure against violations of sections 11 and 12 to avoid liability
under section 15, a controlling person realistically cannot over-
see every transaction regulated by the 1934 Act to escape liabil-
ity under section 20(a). 17' Unlike section 15's limitation to two
liability provisions, section 20(a) potentially encompasses any
fraudulent act. Thus, controlling persons should not be re-
quired to supervise closely every activity undertaken by a con-
trolled person. Rather, a controlling person should impose and
maintain a proper system of supervision, and failure to do so
should be considered reckless behavior.172 If the controlling
person, however, willfully induced or in bad faith prevented
discovery of the fraud, courts still should impose liability, de-
spite the implementation of a supervisory program.
168. Section 15 of the 1933 Act applies only to violations of §§ 11 and 12,
and only issuers and sellers may be sued under these provisions. 1 A. BROM-
BERG & L. LowENFELs, supra note 115, § 2.3(100). Additionally, § 15 does not
impose liability for violations of the 1933 Act's antifraud provision, § 17(a),
which imposes liability for virtually any fraudulent securities transaction. 15
U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982); see supra note 6.
169. Section 10b is the 1934 Act's broad antifraud provision, under which
complainants may sue both sellers and buyers for virtually any fraudulent act
involving securities. Most litigation under § 20(a) attempting to impose secon-
dary liability involves primary liability under § 10b. 2 A. BROMBERG & L.
LowENFELS, supra note 115, § 5.10(430-36). The 1933 Act also has a broad an-
tifraud provision, § 17(a), but a controlling person cannot be sued for violation
of this provision. See supra note 6. A controlling person may only be sued for
violations of §§ 11 and 12. Id.
170. See supra note 6.
171. Indeed, some transactions occur without the firm ever having any
knowledge of the activity. For example, in Lake v. Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,509 (N.D. Ind. 1973), a
plaintiff invested with his broker in a private investment partnership. After
substantial losses, the plaintiff attempted to hold Kidder, Peabody liable as a
controlling person for § 10b violations. Id. at 93,969. The court held Kidder,
Peabody could not be liable because the transaction occurred completely
outside the normal customer-broker relationship. Id at 93,977-78. Other
courts, however, have imposed liability under similar circumstances. See cases
cited supra note 11; see also Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1309 (2d Cir.
1973) (en banc) (noting that Congress anticipated more stringent standard
under 1933 Act than under 1934 Act).
172. For courts agreeing that the controlling person must implement a su-
pervisory system, see infra note 176.
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In addition to substantive differences, the 1934 Act does
not contain the same procedural safeguards that the 1933 Act
provides to a section 15 defendant.173 The 1934 Act, unlike the
1933 Act, does not have a statute of limitations,174 and control-
ling persons remain subject to potential liability for a longer pe-
riod of time.'75 That threat alone, without lowering the
threshold for asserting claims to a negligence standard, will en-
courage controlling persons to implement programs of supervi-
sion to deter fraudulent conduct.176 The 1934 Act also does not
require a complainant to post a bond nor does it permit assess-
ment of litigation costs when a complainant sues a controlling
person.177 Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bar
complainants from asserting frivolous claims under the 1934
Act,178 the Act lacks the procedural safeguards present in the
1933 Act to deter actions against controlling persons when re-
covery is unlikely. Thus, requiring a heightened standard of
proof such as recklessness' 79 protects controlling persons from
173. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976) (noting that
if actions under 1934 Act were based on same negligence standard that §§ 11,
12, and 15 of 1933 Act use, actions would always be brought under 1934 Act,
nullifying effectiveness of carefully drawn procedural restrictions under 1933
Act).
174. For example, § 10b, the most frequently litigated provision in the 1934
Act, does not have a statute of limitations. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1981). Some
courts, however, impose a state limitation period as a matter of federal com-
mon law. See, e.g., Marshall & lsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 808 (7th
Cir. 1987) (applying Wisconsin statute of limitations). State statutes of limita-
tions applied to the 1934 Act, however, are usually longer than the one-year
statute of limitations applied to § 15 of the 1933 Act. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at
210 n.29.
175. See Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 679, 684 (6th Cir. 1981) (because
plaintiff filed complaint so long after alleged fraud, controlling person was
held liable under § 20(a) of 1934 Act but not liable under § 15 of 1933 Act).
176. Many courts agree that a controlling person should be required to
maintain and enforce a system of supervision because of the "ever-present" op-
portunity and temptation to defraud investors. See, e.g., Kravitz v. Pressman,
Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 203, 213 (D. Mass. 1978); accord Paul F.
Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980)
(failure to supervise is evidence of bad faith); Lorenz v. Watson, 258 F. Supp.
724, 732 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (to satisfy good faith requirement, defendants must
show that some precautionary measures were taken to prevent injury suffered
by investor).
177. Section 10b, which is the most frequently utilized provision in actions
brought under the 1934 Act, provides no statute of limitations, and the court's
authorization to award attorney's fees under this section is sharply circum-
scribed. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 210.
178. FED. R. Crv. P. 11.
179. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that recklessness can be a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Ernst &
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having to defend nonmeritorious, harassing claims for secon-
dary liability, while providing investors with adequate protec-
tion from fraud.
CONCLUSION
The 1933 and 1934 Acts hold a controlling person jointly
and severally liable for the fraudulent acts of a controlled per-
son. Congress declined to define a controlling person, delegat-
ing to courts the task of determining the proper standard of
liability based on the specific facts of each case. Without Con-
gress's guidance, however, federal courts have failed to devise
uniform standards to decide when a person is secondarily liable
as a controlling person. This failure has resulted primarily
from attempts to construe both statutes' controlling person pro-
visions as requiring identical standards.
To rectify the difficulty of defining a uniform standard,
courts should recognize that the substantial differences in the
purposes of the two Acts and in the language of their control-
ling person provisions compels the use of different liability
Ernst, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12. The Court, however, has expressly declined to hold
that recklessness would always suffice as scienter under the 1934 Act. Id. The
majority of circuits, acknowledging the Supreme Court's dicta, hold that reck-
lessness is a sufficiently culpable state of mind to satisfy a standard equivalent
to scienter or bad faith. See Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d
1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979) (recklessness satisfies scienter requirement); Nelson
v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th Cir.) (per curiam) (recklessness satisfies
bad faith requirement), cert denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, East-
man, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-45 (2d Cir.) (recklessness is knowing con-
duct and satisfies bad faith standard), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Coleco
Indus. v. Berman, 567 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (recklessness is
similar to conscious intent to defraud), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 830 (1978); First
Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977) (recklessness sat-
isfies scienter requirement), cert denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Sundstrand Corp.
v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.) (recklessness is form
of intentional fraudulent conduct), cert denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
In another context, the Supreme Court has held that recklessness suffices
to meet a subjective bad faith standard. In a defamation action to overcome a
first amendment privilege given to a person speaking about public figures, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with actual malice. The Court
has defined "actual malice" to mean "with knowledge that [the statement] was
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
Additionally, many commentators agree that recklessness should suffice
to meet a bad faith standard. See, e.g., Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts
to Define Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L.
REv. 213, 239 (1977) (recklessness sufficient to satisfy scienter requirement);
Note, supra note 29, at 839-43 (proper standard under § 20(a) of 1934 Act is
recklessness). For the definition of recklessness, see supra note 144.
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standards under each Act. Under both Acts courts should con-
tinue to require the complainant to prove that the defendant
was a controlling person. To defeat liability, however, courts
should require the controlling person to prove nonnegligent
conduct under the 1933 Act. A negligence standard not only
complies with the reasonableness language of the 1933 Act's
controlling person provision, but also conforms with the Act's
requirement of greater protection for investors. Under the 1934
Act, in contrast, courts should require controlling persons to
show that their actions were merely not reckless. The lesser
standard under this Act is justified by the Act's good faith de-
fense as well as its broad coverage of brokerage activity. Sepa-
rate liability standards under each Act will not only remove the
confusion surrounding judicial attempts to create a uniform
standard, but will also further Congress's intent to restore con-
fidence in the securities markets and deter securities fraud.
Nancy C. Staudt

